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The Ship's Force Overhaul Management System (SFOMS) is a
management control system used on board U. S. Navy ships in
overhaul. SFOMS is just one of the many components of the
entire shipboard management system, and in order to be
effective, SFOMS must balance, support, or complement all of
the other system components. This research identified
SFOMS 1 effect on the shipboard authority structures of a
destroyer in overhaul and the resultant effect on SFOMS
usage. SFOMS did increase the authority of upper level
managers by providing them with a wider range of access to
work information. This caused some lower level supervisors
to adjust SFOMS information to prevent their seniors from
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QUESTION: "Today, do you think SFOMS is useful to the work
centers that receive the SFOMS reports?"
ANSWER: "No. They do not understand SFOMS as a management
tool, because we only use it when we go into overhaul. You
don't do that to a man, not a guy down on the deckplates.
You give a man a job, you teach him how to do that job, and
you be consistent with him. For God's sake, when I inspect
a space I don't change my rules every time I go into it.
I'd expect to be shot if I did that. So, what do we do? we
expect them to be the framework of management for
maintenance and repair of a ship, toe train them under an
operational environment to do one thing. That is:
keep the ship moving, and keep people informed. . .there
should be one way for a man to communicate a problem, the
form his corrective action will take, and one way to say
that it's done.
Then we come into overhaul. Approximately one year
before we start the overhaul, we start training our people
about SFOMS. SFOMS is not the way we do business outside of
the shipyard. Is there a problem starting already in this
little discussion? You bet there is! I am now going to
tell a man who has been doing something, doing it very well,
that it's not going to work during overhaul. You've got to
change your ways. He resents that. He's a proud
individual. He knows that he can manage anything in his
space. He's wrong of course. You and I know that, but he
doesn't know that. He's not going to admit it. . .you
embarrass that man by saying that his way of doing business
is no longer good enough. He has to be a very special kind
of person to accept tnat kind of redirection.
Why are we still convincing our sailors how good SFOMS
is? It's because it isn't good. To them it is not good.
If it was good it would sell itself. . .are they good enough
to understand it? Yes. Am I going to spend my time making
them SFOMS experts? Of necessity, I have to for a certain
amount of time."
QUESTION: "What should have happened that didn't happen to
nave made the SFOMS training better?"
ANSWER: " Ch , use SFOMS year round, every year, wherever you
are. Why not?"
A transcript of an interview with
a SFOMS user. Spring, 1932.

I. INTRODUCTION
Provided further, that not less than $3,745,700,000 of
this appropriation shall be available only for regularly
scheduled ship overhauls, restricted availabilities and
expenses associated with the installation of equipment,
improvements, and modifications scheduled to be accom-
plished concurrently during an ovemaul or restricted
availabil i ty
.
Appropriation for Operation and Maintenance, Navy
Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1982
The overhaul of a United States Navy ship is an expen-
sive evolution. During Fiscal Year 1982, the Navy will
spend over three and one half billion dollars on the repair,
renovation, and upgrade of the engineering plants, weapons
systems, and habitability spaces of ships throughout the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. For instance, the average cost
of a ten month overhaul for a typical twenty year old
destroyer is thirty million dollars (Long Beach Naval
Shipyard, 1982). The thirty million dollars only includes
the costs associated with repairs performed by shipyard per-
sonnel. The cost does not include the value of resources
used by the crew to perform ship's force repairs. According
to the Surface Naval Forces, Pacific Fleet comptroller, the
commanding officer of a destroyer type combatant about to
enter overhaul can expect his annual operating target
(OPTAR) funding to increase by at least $170,000 to
$250,000, depending on the size and age of his vessel. This

augmentation could more than double the amount of a ship's
annual OPTAR. (Comptroller, 1982) Also, the thirty million
dollars does not include the cost of salaries and allowances
to support the officers and sailors assigned to the ship in
overhaul. The salaries and benefits of the crew could
easily exceed three million dollars for a crew of two hun-
dred and fifty men (NAVCOMPTNOTE, 1982) . The value of the
crew greatly increases as one considers the direct influence
the officers and enlisted men bear on the shipyard and
consequent shipyard performed work. It is the crew which
plays the most important part in the overhaul. They are the
ones who must accept the final product, a ship able to get
underway and meet all of its operational requirements. The
crew must be qualified to capably monitor and evaluate all
shipyard conducted repairs. They must also be able to
identify that work which is critical to the ship's missions,
but not accepted for shipyard accomplishment, and effi-
ciently and effectively accomplish it.
A. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING OVERHAUL
During the mid-1960 's, the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) determined that, in many instances, Navy ships were
not receiving effective overhauls. This was attributed to
the crew's inability to effectively and efficiently plan and
control ship's force work. Once in overhaul, crews soon
learned they could not manage their work as they did when

their ships were operational. In overhaul, work center
supervisors seldom planned work for more than a couple of
weeks at best. On the other hand, the shipyard supervisors
were experts at long range planning and programming using
time studies, program evaluation and review techniques
(PERT) charts, and the critical path method (CPM) . Shipyard
performed work was generally extremely well planned and
scheduled to the day for the entire overhaul period. It was
within that meticulously planned and highly developed man-
agement control framework that a ship's crew in overhaul was
expected to plan, schedule, perform, and evaluate their own
work. According to the CNO, too many crews in a shipyard
environment lacked the necessary techniques to effectively
and efficiently control their own work. (Carr, 1982; Morris,
1982; and Moen, 1982) In other words, they were unable to
capably exercise management control. Management control can
be defined as "the process by which management assures that
the organization carries out it's strategies effectively and
efficiently," (Anthony and Herzlinger, p. 3, 1982).
Top Navy leadership believed if a formal framework
existed for a crew to develop, schedule, and evaluate their
work for the entire overhaul period, the many problems wit-
nessed in overhaul could be eliminated (Carr, 1982).
B. IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) in Washington, D. C.
was tasked to develop a management control framework for
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ship's force use while in 'overhaul. In the late 1960's,
NAVSEA attempted to solve the problem by contracting out all
planning and monitoring of ship's force work to a private
automated data processing company. NAVSEA quickly
determined that this approach became too costly as the price
of the services rose past $500,000 for a single ship.
NAVSEA continued to seek other solutions. A Navy
organization named Planning and Engineering for Repairs and
Alterations for Aircraft Carriers (PERA CV) was directed by
NAVSEA to develop a computerized management control system
for ship's force use in overhaul. At that time, the Air
Force had shown considerable success in overhauling their
aircraft with the support of a computer based management
control system. PERA CV set out to form their system along
similar lines and finally developed the Ship's Force
Overhaul Management System (SFOMS) . Although SFOMS was
principally developed for aircraft carriers, tne PERA
organizations responsible for other types of Navy ships
(amphibious ships, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates)
modified the system for their own use during the early
1970 's. (Mo en, 1982)
C. THE FLEET SHIP'S FORCE OVERHAUL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
In 1976, the CNO directed one standard system be incor-
porated throughout the Navy, and Fleet SFOMS was born.
11

NAVSEA describes SFOMS as
. . .a management system designed to assist ship's
force in scheduling and controlling its portion of the
overhaul work package. SFOMS revolves around a data file
containing ship's workload and manpower data. The ship
provides the basic input data and manually maintains or
receives back computer sorted reports to provide a better
picture of how its manpower resources are being utilized
during the overhaul (NAVSEA, p. E-l, 1977) .
SFOMS requires that shipboard supervisors plan their work
and document the necessary steps to accomplish each job.
Using this information received from the work center super-
visors, SFOMS compiles man-hour estimates for all jobs and
the periods for which the jobs are scheduled to determine
the level of workload for each work center. Work center
supervisors then update the file weekly to reflect any
changes that have occurred.
In overhaul a new shipboard organization emerges to sup-
port SFOMS. An overhaul manager is appointed to "schedule
and control all ship's force maintenance" and directly
reports to the executive officer (NAVSEA, p. II-E-4, 1977)
.
A SFOMS coordinator is named to assist the overhaul manager
in directing all "personnel efforts and maintenance activi-
ties" (NAVSEA, p. II-E-6, 1977) . A division officer is
required to submit all new jobs to his department head for
approval and then to the SFOMS Coordinator to have the job
information entered into the SFOMS data file. Prior to
overhaul, division officers were able to use their discre-
tion in seeking department head approval to start a job and
12

never had to deal with any reporting requirements beyond the
department head level. An overhaul manager is tasked to
control all ship's force work. This "super" level
department head and his special teams are in a position to
identify new work, direct others in the accomplishment of
that work, and even perform that work themselves.
The overhaul is an important evolution in the life of a
ship. It often provides a means to extend a ship's life
beyond what had been originally planned. The officers and
crew provide the principal resources in that function.
SFOMS was developed to provide them with a management
control tool to efficiently and effectively accomplish all
of the work required for a successful overhaul. However,
despite the fact that an obvious need existed for this type
of system and that SFOMS theoretically could fill that need,
serious problems regarding SFOMS use developed and remain
today.
D. PROBLEMS WITH SFOMS
Since its fleet standardization in 1976, SFOMS appeared
to have been plagued by problems. Planning Research Corpor-
ation (PRC), which is responsible for SFOMS implementation
on Pacific Fleet combatants, such as cruisers, destroyers,
and frigates, surveys ship's personnel regarding SFOMS at
the end of each overhaul. Forty-five percent of all
respondents indicated SFOMS did not increase their
13

effectiveness in determining work and work assignments while
only thirty-nine percent felt SFOMS increased their effec-
tiveness. The survey also indicated that at least seventy
percent found four of the five SFOMS generated weekly
reports not "very beneficial" (Planning and Engineering, pp.
20-26, 1981). One possible explanation of these problems is
that SFOMS alters operational lines of authority and
information flows in the shipboard management control system
resulting in an unfavorable reaction to SFOMS and a lower
level of use of SFOMS by ship personnel.
This thesis investigates the impact of SFOMS on autnor-
ity structures, information reporting structures, and job
determinations and assignments. SFOMS' effect on the exist-
ing shipboard structures must be understood because the com-
patibility of the two could determine whether or not SFOMS
can fulfill the need for which it was designed. An organi-
zation's authority structure is the root of its management
control system. Authority, "uhe power to make decisions
which guide the actions of others," is what secures manage-
ment control within the organization (Simon, p. 125, 1976).
Authority provides management the power to make decisions to
use their resources efficiently and effectively. An organi-
zation cannot have an effective management control system
without authority. Information reporting structures, job
14

determinations, and job assignments are measureable
attributes of the authority structure.
This research identified pre-SFOMS lines of authority
and information flows on a Navy ship prior to overhaul and
the corresponding lines of authority and information flows
following the commencement of overhaul. The information was
obtained through interviews with the commanding officer (CO)
executive officer (XO) , weapons and engineering department
heads, overhaul manager, SFOMS coordinator, and a division
officer, Chief Petty Officer, and a maintenance man from
both the engineering and weapons departments of a United
States Navy ship. Authority, information flows, and work
assignments in pre-SFOMS management control systems are then
compared with those actually occurring during SFOMS imple-
mentation. This information is then analyzed in terms of
theoretical models of authority in management control
systems
.
The first chapter of this thesis discussed the need for
effective management control in overhaul, the history of the
development of SFOMS to meet that need, and SFOMS subsequent
management control problems. The second chapter discusses
the idea of authority within models of management control
systems. Chapter three provides the model and its conse-
quent data collected through the interviews and the analysis





This chapter explores the relationship between authority
and management control. Authority is defined in terms of
effectiveness and in terms of the measureable characteris-
tics of communication flows or reporting patterns and worx
determinations and assignments.
SFOMS is one example of many computer based management
control systems in use throughout the United States. The
computer, frequently considered a panacea to management's
control problems, often fails to live up to expectations
(Lucas, 1975). Management control specialists have
frequently made the computer the subject of study in an
attempt to determine why it does not always enhance
management control (Lucas, 1975). The reasons for failure
appear varied and wide reaching. Some individuals are
discouraged and frightened by the computer and its ability
to produce countless numbers of neatly ordered charts,
graphs, and tables (Faerbor and Ratliff, 1980). Others
cannot make any sense of the print-outs or are overwnelmed
by too many computer reports. Some systems' users perceive
real or imagined inaccuracies in the data and consequently
discredit all of the information produced (Lucas, 1975).
Some users' expectations are set unreal istically high only
to be dashed wnen the system's design or implementation
16

fails to meet those expectations (Faerbor and Ratliff,
1980). Many of the studies conclude that the failure of
computer based management control systems lies in some
aspect of the system's implementation process within the
organization (Lucas, 1975; Doktor, Schultz and Sieving,
1975; Keen and Morton, 1978; and Anthony and Herzlinger,
1980). Many management control designers are finding that
the implementation process of a computer based control sys-
tem is exceedingly more complex than the actual design pro-
cess. Management has learned that even if a system is
designed well and is technically proficient, the system just
is not successful if it is not used properly. All of this
points out that a major reason for systems failure rests not
on technical deficiencies within individual computer control
systems, but on organizational behavior problems. (Lucas,
1975) These problems may consist of: an organization's
resistance to new systems, an unbalanced management system,
and a resistance to changes in authority through changes in
communication flows and general work responsibilities.
A. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
A computer supported management control system often
threatens the members of an organization through its highly
rational and impersonal approach. The system upsets the
organization's existing equilibrium and at times appears
insensitive to personal relationships and problems. (Keen
17

and Morton, 1978) It would not be surprising then that even
if the members of an organization recognized a need to
change existing inadequate procedures or systems, they could
very well resist change in preference of those same old
inadequate existing routines with which they are more
comfortable and familiar (Anthony and Herzlinger, 1980).
Another reason for this resistance could be:
...a lack of consonance between the distribution of
power implied by an information system and the distribu-
tion of power existing in the organi zation . . . The origins
of resistance are found not in the presence or absence of
any particular tactic for introducing change, but in the
interaction of the substance of the change with its
organizational context. (Markus, p. 209, 1981)
The information channels, responsibility structures, and
symbols created by the new system can cause user resistance
if those channels, structures, or symbols diverge from those
already in existence within the organization (Markus,
p. 211, 1981). Markus states, "The presence or absence of
implementation tactics .. .cannot produce accepted or success-
ful systems in and of themselves, but they may be instru-
mental, in a secondary way, in affecting the degree to which
a computer based system diverges from the organizational
power structure" (Markus, p. 211, 1981). Systems designers
must consider the effect changes to power or authority rela-
tionships may have on the existing organizational structure.
Management must also be able to recognize these changes dur-
ing the design and implementation stages (Lee and Steinberg,
1980). Often, management overlooks the fact that new control
18

systems involve changing not only procedures but concepts of
authority and control as well within existing management
processes (Keen and Morton, 1978). It is from the existing
organizational authority relationships that the computer
based management control system must ultimately evolve.
Clearly, these organizational variables need to be
considered during implementation (Lucas, 1975).
B. A FULLY INTEGRATED SYSTEM
The various controls, authority relationships, informa-
tion flows and computer based information systems found
within an organization are interrelated and should be con-
sidered as an entire or total management system (Ackoff,
1970) . The total management system should be designed to
support all aspects of the organization's operations. Each
element of the total system must obviously be in balance with
any and all elements of that system. (Thomas, 1973) The
effectiveness of the total system is reduced if one aspect
is working to the detriment of another (Hopwood, 1974). One
might compare the balancing of the different elements of a
total system to one hundred percent of an individual's
efforts. If more attention is needed on one activity, less
attention is available for another activity. There must oe
a trade-off. (Newman, 1975) One element cannot be viewed
clearly without understanding its position within the entire
system. In addition, an element should not be changed
19

without recognizing the potential impact the change would
have upon the other elements throughout the entire system.
A computer based management control system is one ele-
ment of the total shipboard management system. The author-
ity relationships, information reporting structures, and
other work assignment responsibilities inherent in that
computer control system should complement, balance and not
work at cross purposes with other elements throughout the
total system. Authority is an integral part of each element
of the total management system and should be carefully under-
stood to better appreciate its important control function.
C. AUTHORITY WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION
Formal rules, standard procedures, and informal guide-
lines are used by an organization's management to direct the
behavior of subordinate supervisors and employees. Their
aim is to lessen the supervisors and enployees' need to per-
sonally search for methods to solve problems. The direct-
ives obviously must be followed if tney are to be effective.
Management needs to exercise authority to guarantee their
rules, procedures and guidelines are followed. This results
in greater management control. (Santos, 1973)
1. Structuralist View of Authority
Authority may be viewed from at least two perspect-
ives. The first perspective is known as the structuralist
view. This view may be defined as, "the legitimate exercise
20

of imperative control ... the probability that a command with
a specific content will be obeyed by a given group,"
(Santos, p. 244, 1978). Here, authority is a function of
the organization. Authority is derived from highly struc-
tural and well defined positions within the organization.
It is important to point out that the Structuralist view
does not vest authority in individuals but in the organiza-
tional positions they occupy.
2. Behavioralist View of Authority
The second perspective of authority is the
behavioralist view. In this instance authority is a person
to person relationship. In order for authority to exist the
individual subjected to the authority must understand the
order, find the order compatible with the general missions
of the organization as well as his own personal interests,
and be physically and emotionally able to carry out the
order. In this view, authority is finally realized if the
individual accepts the order. (Santos, 1978)
3. Effectiveness of Authority
The various definitions of authority differ on
whether authority is derived from formal positions or from
individuals. In addition, behav ioral ists claim authority-
only exists if it is accepted while the structuralists state
that acceptance simply is a measure of authority's effect-
iveness. For the purpose of this research it makes little
difference whether authority is derived from the individual
21

or from his position or whether acceptance is a necessary"
condition for existence of authority. For purposes of this
study it is sufficient to accept that authority does exist
within an organization whatever its derivation. The impor-
tance of authority to management control rests on its
ef fectivenss , and a discussion whether authority must be
accepted to be established or whether acceptance is irrele-
vant to authority's actual existence will not be pursued
here. Authority will be considered as "the power to make
decisions to guide the actions of others/' (Simon, p. 125,
1976). It is derived from individuals, their abilities, and
their positions. Authority is effective if individuals
within the organization allow it to be a personal guide to
their actions.
An individual may accept authority if he perceives
rewards or sanctions, believes it is what people ought to do
regardless of their personal beliefs, feels social approval
will be gained, or if he feels confident of the competence
of the person exercising the authority (Santos, 1978).
Acceptance of authority will occur more easily if aims are
shared. However, if organizational goals are in dispute,
managers must exercise the power of their authority in
inducing compliance to orders. (Hopwood, 1974) Within an
organization certain posts are accepted by its members as
being positions of authority. The president, production
manager, and clerical staff supervisor are examples of
22

positions of authority in a commercial firm. The CO, XO,
and department heads, division officers, Chief Petty
Officers and work center supervisors are examples on U. S.
Navy ships. Their realized degree of authority is naturally
enhanced or diminished by their own demonstrated abilities
to their juniors as well as seniors and in the way the
individuals fulfilling the authority positions interact with
other organizational members. This interaction is important
to authority. By means of interaction, authority is
realized, and this interaction necessitates the use of
communication
.
D. COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION FLOW
Communication may be defined as, "A process whereby
decisional premises are transmitted from one member of an
organization to another," (Simon, p. 154, 1976). Management
develops plans, directives and guides to influence the
actions of its subordinates. These must then be communi-
cated to the subordinates who decide, whether or not, they
will accept the guides. Authority plays an instrumental
role in their decision. (Simon, 1976) An organization can-
not fruitfully exist without communication as there then
would be no way to exercise authority needed to influence
the actions of others in order to achieve the organization's
goals. (Simon, 1976) Authority is realized to the degree by
which the communication is accepted and a desired response
23

is elicited from a member of the organization. (Santos,
1978) Formal authority may be enough to elicit compliance
in the individual receiving the order, but at times the
communication must also "reason, plead, and persuade as well
as order if it is to be effective," (Simon, p. 164, 1976).
Management may also define the authority relationships
within an organization by specifying the types of reporting
patterns between individuals. (Hopwood, 1974) Communication
patterns or information flows are a definite measure of
authority within an organization.
1. Communication and the Computer
Computer based management control systems may quite
unintentionally change communication patterns and conse-
quently upset existing authority relationships when the sys-
tems are implemented in an organization. According to
Markus , "By changing who has access to what information or
who has control over key data bases, a management informa-
tion system can altar power bases, disturbing patterns of
communication, influence in an organization and consequently
alter prestige and status," (Markus, p. 209, 1981). If a
computer based control system provides for the distribution
of performance reports to managers who before did not have
access to that information, those managers may be able to
assume different and greater positions of authority by vir-
tue of their added knowledge. Existing authority structures
could seriously erode if they are consistently challenged by
24

new authority relationships emerging from the new control
system. (Markus, 1981) The opposite is also true. New
systems reporting structures could bypass some individuals
thus diminishing their authority and eroding the existing
control system.
2 . Information Disruptions
Changes to information reporting patterns or exist-
ing communication structures can be a cause of great concern
to many within an organization. Some individuals feel sen-
iors might be able to exercise greater control over them if
the seniors are provided with better information about their
efforts. This is not always desirable. (Anthony and
Herzlinger, 1980) Subordinates may find themselves changing
or doctoring information to present a better picture of
their efforts to seniors while fulfilling newly imposed con-
trol reporting requirements (Simon, 1978). Other informa-
tion might only be passed upward if the transmitter believes
it will not result in unpleasant consequences, or if he
believes the senior would otherwise learn of it through dif-
ferent channels (Simon, 1976). Some organizational members
might resist outright new information reporting structures
if data is collected, controlled, and furnished by new
sources (Anthony and Herzling, 1980). The changes to
reporting structures disrupt existing routines and relation-
ships and cloud the organization with uncertainty as to how
25

these changes will affect authority relationships and con-
sequently the individual himself.
E. WORK DETERMINATION AND ASSIGNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
Authority, as previously discussed, is effective if it
influences the actions of others. Within an organization,
this influence is also exercised through the responsibility
of determining work projects and issuing subsequent work
assignments and directives. Authority can be measured by
identifying the individuals responsible for determining work
or creating jobs and by assigning others to accomplish that
work. When a computer based management control system is
implemented, management must take existing relationships
into account to ensure that the two complement each other.
If not, as with changes to general information flow
patterns, existing authority structures could ultimately
erode.
?. CONCLUSIONS
Authority is a vital component of an organization's
structure and entire management system. It is what guides,
directs, and influences each member to sufficiently produce
congruent efforts to achieve desired goals. Authority may
be derived from the organization's formal, defined positions
or from the individuals, and their talents, occupying those
positions. To be effective, authority must be accepted by
those over whom it is exercised. They in turn must be able
26

to carry out the orders as well as find the orders compat-
ible with their and the organization's interests. Authority
requires communications to exist. An effective means to
transmit orders must be present within the organization. At
the same time, communication patterns are a measure of
authority relationships. Effective authority exists between
individuals if one is able to direct the actions of another.
In order for this to occur, some type of communication must
be present in order to convey the orders or directives.
Within an organization, authority may be measured by examin-
ing the manner in which the individuals are required to
interact or communicate. These communication patterns could
include not only reporting work status and completion
reports but general information flows such as daily routine
reports as well. Authority may also be measured by identi-
fying work determination and assignment responsibl il i ties
within an organization's structure. The individual who is
able to determine what work must be accomplished and then is
responsible for making the appropriate work assignments is
in a position of authority over the individual who must
actually perform the work. Changes to authority as a result
of new control systems may be resisted if organizational
members perceive such changes not to be in their own inter-
ests or compatible with their own positions of authority.
Authority plays an important function in an organiza-
tion's management control system. Authority is the driving
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force behind work determinations and assignments, and
reporting requirements and other information flows necessary
to provide management with the information they require to
direct the organization in achieving its goals.
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III. THE MODEL AND EMPIRICAL DATA
This chapter provides the framework to which the author-
ity relationships before and after SFOMS implementation are
compared and evaluated. The results of the SFOMS interviews
conducted on board a United States Navy ship in overhaul are
also provided.
A. PRE-SFOMS AUTHORITY STRUCTURES
In order to understand SFOMS' effect on existing pre-
overhaul authority structures within the entire shipboard
management control system, the pre-SFOMS lines of authority
must first be carefully identified. The commanding officer
has the ultimate responsibility for the safety, well being
and efficiency of his command (OPNAVINST(a) , 1979) . He is
directly assisted by the executive officer. The XO is
responsible to the CO for the organization, performance of
duty, and good order and discipline of the entire command.
(OPNAVINST(a) , 1979) A Navy combatant typically has four
major departments: engineering, operations, supply, and
weapons. Each department is headed by an officer who is
responsible for department effectiveness. The department
head must plan, direct, and supervise the work and training
within his department and must keep the CO informed of the
general condition of his department. ( OPNAVINST (a) , 1979)
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The departments are composed of various divisions each ful-
filling a unique mission. The weapons department may have a
gun division, a missile division, and a deck division. The
engineering department might be composed of a boiler divi-
sion, machinery division, electrical division, and repair
division. Divisional responsibility is held by a junior
officer who is directly responsible for the proper perfor-
mance of the duties assigned to his division (OPNAVINST( a)
,
1979) . The division officer is generally assisted by a
Chief Petty Officer. Division structures vary but are
usually further divided into various work centers responsi-
ble for specific tasks. Work center supervisors generally
are first or second class petty officers who head mainten-
ance groups responsible for the equipment, machinery, and
tasks assigned to the group. ( OPNAVINST (a) , 1979) Each
position lies in the chain of command of vertical authority
relationships. Even though numerous collateral duties do
exist and are assigned to personnel throughout the ship,
thus somewhat clouding reporting relationships, all individ-
uals performing primary functions and duties pertaining to
the ship's missions have one immediate supervisor in the
chain of command to whom they report and are accountable.
Authority relationships based on job assignments throughout
the ship are further enhanced by the use of military rank
and its inherent authority relationships imposed by law. It
is within this framework that ship's work is identified,
developed, programmed, performed, and evaluated.
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B. PRE-SFOMS MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS
Prior to overhaul the Planned Maintenance System (PMS)
is the primary method a ship's force uses to accomplish
routine maintenance. Maintained by the Chief of Naval
Material, PMS covers each piece of equipment and machinery
onboard a ship and provides all routine maintenance proce-
dures, the tools required for the maintenance, and the
specific levels of technical proficiency needed by the indi-
viduals who perform the maintenance. ( OPNAVINST(b) , 1974)
PMS is supported by ship's force work lists (SFVvL) or
work center discrepancy logs (WCDL) . The actual format
varies from ship to ship but invariably contains lists of
equipment requiring repairs and identifies the repair parts
required which are on order in the supply system. These
logs are maintained by the work center supervisor and are
periodically reviewed by the CPO, division officer, and
department head. The Current Ship's Maintenance Project
(CSMP) is a computer provided listing of all work center
jobs and required actions which have been deferred for
various reasons. Computer inputs are provided by the work
center supervisor and approved by the division officer,
deparment head, XO, and CO. (OPNAVINST( b) , 1974) CSMP
inputs are introduced by all ships into a central computer
file. The requirements imposed on a work center by all of
these systems, logs, lists, and forms do not preclude a */ork
center supervisor, CPO, division officer, or department head
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from using unique personal lists detailing work to be
accomplished.
C. SFOMS, ANOTHER REQUIREMENT
Once a ship enters overhaul, it is expected to identify,
program, and evaluate all work under the SFOMS system in
addition to using all previously mentioned systems.
Although most of the ship's equipment and machinery is made
inactive during overhaul and consequently very little PMS
action is required, all administrative requirements remain
in force from the other systems and must be accomplished in
addition to all SFOMS requirements. (NAVSEA, 1977)
D. THE METHOD
SFOMS' effect on existing authority structures was
determined by identifying the lines of authority on board a
ship before and after a SFOMS implementation. The lines of
authority are manifested through the relationships between
individuals. These relationships surround work identifica-
tion, programming, and assignments. The lines of authority
are also revealed through the job status reporting require-
ments imposed on lower level managers by seniors. The
actual direction and flow these reports take are indicative
of the established lines of authority. The crew of a single





Authority structures were identified by asking questions
of individuals on a ship which had entered overhaul three
weeks before the interviews were conducted. Unfortunately,
scheduling requirements prevented a visit to the ship before
overhaul commenced to supplement a visit following SFOMS
implementation. Admittedly information based on individ-
uals' recollections of how authority structures existed
a month earlier has its limitations. Regardless, the
results of this initial researcn should still provide a use-
ful insight into the problem of SFOMS 1 effect on authority.
Neither the identity of the ship nor tne names of the indi-
vidual participants will be disclosed. The ship was a des-
troyer type combatant. The individuals interviewed included
the CO, XO, weapons and engineering department heads, a
division officer, CPO, and a work center supervisor/mainten-
ance man from both the weapons and engineering departments,
the overhaul manager, and tne 3FQMS coordinator.
The ship involved had a normal operational crew in
excess of three hundred men, although at the time of the
interviews manning levels had dropped to less than two nun-
dred because of leave, temporary assignments, and transfers.
A questionnaire was developed specifically for each position
within the ship's organizational hierarchy. The questions
were designed to identify authority relationships before the
SFOMS implementation and the same questions were used to
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identify the relationships following the SFOMS
implementation
.
F. THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
A set of questions was developed to identify the author-
ity relationships existing throughout the ship's chain of
command from the level of the work center supervisor up to
the CO. Exhibit 1 displays the basic core of questions in
which lines of authority, information flows and reporting
requirements, and work determinations and assignments were
identified for each position. Each question was asked twice
(as demonstrated in Exhibit 1, questions A. la and A. lb) to
determine the authority relations existing before and after
the SFOMS implementation.
The individuals interviewed were asked to provide
details about specific jobs, both routine and non-routine in
forming their answers. The questions were pointedly asked
along the lines of "what did you do then?" and "who told you
to do that for that particular job?" This was done to mini-
mize an individual's tendency to relate what should have
happened rather than what actually happened. The list of
questions was tailored to each level of the chain of com-
mand, and follow-up questions were often as.<ed in order to
gain a better understanding of the respondents' thoughts.
The following is a discussion of the purpose of the ques-




A. Work determinations and assignments.
la. Before you entered overhaul did your work center
have a plan of work to be accomplished each
week?
lb. This week in overhaul, did your work center have
a plan of work to be accomplished?
2. Describe the plan.
3. How was it determined?
4. Who participated in its determination?
5. Did you personally keep any records?
6. Describe them.
7. On a given day, how did you know what work to
do?
8. Who gave you your assignment?
9. In what form was your assignment given?
10. Did you ever decide or suggest what work you
would do?
11. What procedures are involved in order to do that
wor k?
12. Do you make assignments to subordinates?
13. What form do you use to make the assignment?
14. If you initiated or suggested a job, how did you
go about getting it started?
15. Whose approval was received?
16. If jobs were ever disapproved, describe the
situation surrounding the disapproval.
B. Information flows and reporting requirements.
1. As a job progressed, what happened?
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2. As a day ended and you were not done, what did
you do?
3. Did you tell anyone of the job status at any
time?
4. If you had any questions, who did you ask?
5. Were they answered?
6. When you were given the job what information was
provided and who provided it?
7. When you were given the job, what reporting
requirements were placed on you and by whom?
C. General authority relationships.
1. How did you know when a job was finished?
2. When a job was finished, what did you do?
Did anyone inspect or approve your work?3.
4. Did you inspect or approve a subordinate's
wor k?
5. After you completed a job, did anyone above you
in the chain of command tell you the job was not
finished?
6. If that occurred describe the situation and
resulting actions.
7. Did any individuals personally visit your work
area to monitor the work in progress? Who?
3. Were you ever required to perform some action
related to your work by someone who was not
directly in your chain of command?
9. Describe the situation.
10. How was the conflict resolved and by whom was it
resolved?
11. Did you ever have a job that conflicted with the
efforts of other in your work center/division?
12. Describe the situation and how it was resolved.
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1. Work Center Supervisor
The questions under the heading of work
determinations and assignments were used to identify the
work planning processes within a work center and the key
participants in those processes. The ability to identify
jobs, give work instructions, assignments, and final job
start approval or disapproval are characteristics of the job
responsibilities of personnel in authority positions. The
questions grouped under information flows and reporting
requirements identified individuals who were able to specify
particular job procedures as well as require work status
reports. The general authority relations questioning
offered a further indication of whom the maintenance
men/work center supervisors saw as being in positions of
authority responsible for inspecting completed jobs, and
giving job completion approval or disapproval. These
questions also provided a means to determine who were able
to give orders which conflicted with already given
assignments. The general authority relation questions also
provided the information to determine personnel who had the
authority to resolve these conflicts in addition to
resolving job coordination problems. At times, additional
questions requiring responses describing general impressions





2. Chief Petty Officer/Division Officer
The questions used to determine the authority
relations at this level of the snipboard chain of command
were similar to the questions designed for the work center
supervisor/maintenance man. They were modified along the
lines from "who gave you work to do?" to "who gave you work
for your subordinate personnel to do?" Again the questions
were asked twice to determine the authority relationships
existing before and after SFOMS implementation. An example
of pre-SFOMS work determination and assignments questions
follow
:
Did your division have a plan of work to be
accomplished each week prior to overhaul?
Describe the plan.
How was it determined?
Who participated in its determination?
Here again the CPOs and division officers were asked to
provide details about specific jobs in response to each
question. The work determination and assignment questions
identified the work planning process and participants
involved at the divisional level encompassing the work cen-
ters. The questions were also used to determine who gave
job start approval and disapproval at that level and who
made actual daily work assignments. Questions grouped under
the neading of information flows and reporting requirements
helped to determine the CPO/division officer's positions in

the work status information reporting network. The
reporting requirements they placed on their subordinates as
well as the requirements others placed on them would be
indicative of the authority relationships within the ship's
management structure. The question asking "what information
guidelines were given you along with job assignments for
your division?" was used to determine the amount of job
authority or discretion, a CPO/division officer retained
even when the job was assigned by a different level of
authority. The general authority relation questions were
developed to identify the personnel having the authority to
approve jobs as being completed, and to identify the
processes used for job completion approval. These questions
were also used to determine the personnel involved in job
scheduling conflicts and the personnel who subsequently
resolved the conflicts.
3. Department Heads/XO/CO
The questions for the department heads were similar
to those for the CPO/division officer except the questions
were framed from a higher organizational level. The XO was
interviewed to determine his participation in the conduct of
work planning and assignment, and monitoring progress. His
participation in conflict resolutions was also identified.
The CO provided a very general description of the management
framework within his command and SFOMS' position within that
framework. Each question was asked twice to identify the
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authority relationships before and after the SFOMS implemen-
tation. An example of the general authority relation
questions asked of the department heads follows:
Following overhaul commencement this week, did your
department ever have a job that conflicted with the work
of other departments?
Describe the situation.
An example of a general authority relations question asked
of the XO is:
Following overhaul commencement, this week have there
been any scheduling conflicts between divisions or
departments? At what level? Who resolved them?
4. SFOMS Coordinator and Overhaul Manager
The questions asked the SFOMS coordinator and over-
haul manager were developed to identify SFOMS reporting
procedures and to determine the organizational structure as
a result of SFOMS.
G. THE INTERVIEW RESULTS
As the basic core of questions was asi<ed to eacn suc-
ceeding level of the chain of command, authority relation-
ships revealed at the previous level were either validated
or refuted. Each individual willingly participated and
answered all questions openly. All interviews were con-
ducted during a one week period in the Spring of 1982.
The authority relationships identified as a result of
the interviews are presented in terms of 1) the effect on
work determination and assignments; 2) information flows and
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. Effect on Work Determination and Assignments
Prior to overhaul, in both engineering and weapons
departments, work projects generally were programmed and
assigned at the lowest supervisory level in the division,
typically by the work center supervisor. PMS quarterly pro-
gramming was performed by the work center supervisor. He
also made the actual daily PMS job assignments. The divi-
sion's CPO, the division officer and department head
reviewed and approved the quarterly programmed PMS schedule,
and the division officer would approve the daily assign-
ments. Approximately ninety percent of the non-routine work
was originated at the work center level and all were
recorded in the SFWL, the CSMP, or lists unique to the work
centers. Work center supervisors, with the assistance of
the division's CPO would make daily non-routine work
assignments. The remaining ten percent of the non-routine
items were originated at the division officer or department
head level although actual assignments to accomplish the
work continued to be made by the work center supervisor.
Non-routine jobs were brought, to the division officer level
or above for approval when work involved a repair to a
weapon system or the engineering plant which affected the
ship's ability to perform its missions.
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Work center supervisors were allowed latitude as to
whether to seek non-routine job approval from their division
officers or department heads. Non-routine jobs originating
at the XO/CO level or at off-ship industrial activities
requiring some type of response by a work center were passed
through the cnain of command down to the appropriate work
center level for action. Job start disapproval occurred at
the division officer level or department head level. Disap-
proval was due to conflicts with the ship's operational
schedule, and the jobs had to be postponed until later.
Following overhaul commencement and SFOMS implementa-
tion, work center supervisors continued to identify the
majority of work for their work centers to accomplish.
Divisional CPO's assisted in this task with division
officers and department heads at times providing inputs.
PMS , on equipment not declared inactive, continued to be
performed as it nad been prior to overhaul. A.ll other
routine and non-routine jobs were documented for SFOMS at
the work center supervisory level. All new SFOMS joos and
weekly updates were sent to the SFOMS coordinator via the
divisional CPO, division officer and department head. Ail
jobs were routed tnrough the CPO, division officer and
department nead for their approval in order to get the job
into the SFOMS data file.
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Work center supervisors could no longer use their
discretion in seeking upper level approval for job starts on
some work. All jobs had to be routed through the department
head level if they were to be placed into the SFOMS system.
However, work center supervisors claimed no job had ever
been disapproved and the division officers and department
heads seemed more concerned with the report format rather
than the actual content of the job. The division officers
and department heads verified this by stating that although
they were interested in the content of some major jobs, they
were more concerned with whether the SFOMS job input forms
and updates were properly completed. The officers ques-
tioned said that in most cases the work center supervisors
and CPO's were fully capable to identify and approve the
work which needed to be accomplished. Work center supervi-
sors were also asked whether the SFOMS coordinator appeared
to be approving or disapproving their work. Again, they
said he was concerned with format and man-hour scheduling
and not job content. The SFOMS coordinator confirmed this
by stating he felt he could better assist the work centers
by helping them plan the timing of their work to prevent
scheduling overload conditions.
2. Pre-SFOMS Information Access
Prior to overhaul, the degree to which division
officers, department heads, the XO, and CO were kept
informed of the status of all work in progress narrowed at
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each succeeding level of the chain of command. Work cenier
supervisors knew of all work in progress by their mainten-
ance men. The work center supervisors tried to keep their
CPO's fairly well informed of their work status. It was the
CPO's who performed the first observed level of information
filtering by bringing to the attention of their division
officer only basic work progress information and some
details on major jobs in progress. Division officers con-
tinued the screening process to their department heads and
the department heads to the XO and CO. Information of con-
cern to the engineering plant or the weapons systems flowed
unimpeded to the XO/CO level. Information of interest to
the CO and XO was provided upon request. The engineering
officer had imposed greater information reporting require-
ments upon his division officers than had the weapons offi-
cer because of the importance of the engineering plant to
all of the ship's missions.
In addition, various formal means existed to provide
information to the XO/CO level. Sight o'clock reports pro-
vided information concerning equipment experiencing major
casualties or failures. The Management Team and the
Planning Board for Training which were composed of the
department heads and other key individuals designated by the
XO would discuss present and forthcoming events and would
resolve any scheduling conflicts. However even given the
formal and informal means of requesting and providing
44

information throughout the chain of command, information was
screened and filtered as it flowed upward.
Work center supervisors were also asked how often they
observed their CPO, division officer, department head, XO
and CO collecting their own work status information by
actual physical inspection. CPO's were seen within the work
center work space on a very regular basis several times a
day. The two division officers were seen within the work
spaces about once a day. Department heads were seen less
frequently, once or twice a week, as were the XO and CO. In
the engineering department, officers stood watches within
major work spaces, the fire rooms and engine rooms, and were
able to observe any work being conducted concurrently with
their watches. However, when not on watch the engineering
division officer and department head visited the work spaces
at the same frequency as their counterparts in the weapons
department. When the division officers and department heads
were asked how often they visited work centers to monitor
work in progress their answers tended to confirm the
responses of the work center supervisors. Althougn, the
officers admitted to slightly higher visit rates, one or two
visits more per week, than attested by their enlisted men.
3. SFOMS' Widened Information Access
With the implementation of SFOMS, more detailed job
information and scheduling information were available to
more levels within the chain of command. This increased
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some officers* desire to receive more information. One work
center supervisor stated:
They want to know what jobs we have scheduled, now we
are doing on them, the update, what the status is, if our
materials have been received, and the status on
those... They want to see that everything is running
smooth, that jobs are being done on time, man-nours are
being expended, and wnen jobs aren't being completed that
it's being documented.
Even though similar perceptions of more information
being desired by superiors were held by other interviewees,
the actual occurrence of individuals desiring greater access
to work information or even using the greater levels of
information that were currently available as a result of
SFOMS was not consistently found throughout the chain of
command
.
The CO and XO continued to receive work progress infor-
mation through the formal and informal channels as they nad
prior to overhaul. However, in addition, the SFOMS system
provided them man-hour usage and man-hour programmed sched-
uling reports. The CO and XO stated tnat they used those
reports to look for patterns indicative of scheduling prob-
lems or inefficient man-hour usage. The XO stated chat
if he uncovered such a problem he would bring it to the
responsible department head's attention for immediate
resolution. One department head said:
The CO and XO use it to ask questions. The CO is
heavy on man-hour utilization and uses it (the SFOMS




The CO and XO are interested in what the ship's force
is doing by looking at what work they have documented
(through SFOMS) . They are interested in what slack we
have, and can we identify new work?
Throughout the chain of command, the individuals interviewed
believed the CO and XO to have been using SFOMS in this
manner
.
The department heads interviewed used their SFOMS
reports to solely identify an inefficient programming of
man-hours and other possible problem areas. This actual
practice differed from perceptions held by the department
heads' subordinates who believed the two department heads to
have been using SFOMS more extensively to monitor all work.
The senior managers' increased ability to monitor the
work of their juniors, as a result of SFOMS, caused some
lower level supervisors to view SFOMS as a negative manage-
ment weapon, and subsequently, SFOMS usage was affected.
The first SFOMS reports .. .were used as a weapon I
suppose. This was not well received.
Engineering Department Head
The SFOMS reports tell everybody what we need to do.
I guess it's a two edged sword. The reports show we
aren't doing something and we get hammered for it...
Engineering Division Officer
To me it doesn't seem feasible . . . this week I had to
defer 5000 man hours in one space... just to get the





One supervisor stated that he had changed the number of
actual man-hours scheduled for his work center to a lower
number. Although the lower number was not realistic, the
supervisor said it was more acceptable to his seniors and ne
"wouldn't get hammered about it."
Another example of numbers being changed because of a
senior's increased ability to monitor work was revealed by
the SFOMS coordinator. He said that he had encountered sev-
eral situations where work center supervisors had inflated
their man-hour work loads to present an appearance that their
work centers were fully programmed, when in actuality they
were not. This was done to prevent a department head from
reading in his SFOMS report that idle man power resources
existed in those work centers. According to the SFOMS coor-
dinator, the work center supervisors who inflated their work
load on the SFOMS report apparently thought the seniors would
direct the idle workers to centers where they were needed.
Division officers and CPO's continued to be informed of
work progress as they had prior to overhaul. The SFOMS
reporting system was not their primary source of
information
.
4 . Effect of SFOMS Organizational Structure
A SFOMS organization is peculiar to ships in over-
haul. A SFOMS organization naturally does not exist outside
of overhaul. The creation of authority positions to support
the SFOMS organization once a ship enters overhaul would
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obviously be a change to pre-overhaul shipboard authority
structures. On the ship where the interviews were con-
ducted, not one of the interview participants said that the
overhaul manager or SFOMS coordinator had invaded any of
their own personal areas of authority. Some respondents
stated that at times these two individuals and their special
action teams provided support and expertise to areas simply
where it was needed. The SFOMS coordinator and overhaul
manager echoed this sentiment by stating that they were to
provide management assistance to the divisions and not to
usurp the authority behind that management. Some conflicts
did occur between the divisions and the SFOMS organization
but they were all admitted to be minor in nature and were
resolved. The respondents' only criticism of the SFOMS
organization was that it required too many personnel to
support it thus denying divisions the use of many of their
personnel. However, this was not viewed so much as losing
authority over subordinates as losing the capability of




IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter provides the conclusions drawn from the
interviews and the subsequent recommendations for future
SFOMS use.
The results of the interviews offer an interesting mix
of perspectives of SFOMS' effect on the authority structures
within the entire shipboard management system. Perspectives
of SFOMS varied throughout the chain of command. Three gen-
eral conclusions can be drawn, however, which are supported
by the statements made by the interview participants at each
level of the chain of command. The conclusions are:
Work Determination and Assignments
The SFOMS system and its designed procedures for
planning, programming and assigning work did not change
the authority relationships for planning, programming,
and assigning work in existence prior to overhaul;
Information Flows and Reporting Requirements
The SFOMS reporting system gave a greater access of
information throughout the chain of command subsequently
affecting authority relationships as contrasted to the
reporting systems and authority relationsnips prior to
the SFOMS implementation. In two cases actual SFOMS
usage was affected by the change in authority due to
SFOMS widening of information access channels throughout
the chain of command; and,
Effects of SFOMS' Organizational Structure
SFOMS new organizational structure and its corresponding
authority relationships did not seriously impact on
authority structures existing prior to overhaul.
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A. WORK DETERMINATION AND ASSIGNMENTS
Under SFOMS , work center supervisors continued to make
about ninety percent of the work determinations and assign-
ments. They were directly assisted by their CPO's. The
work center supervisors received direction from their
division officers and department heads on the remaining
jobs. Although the SFOMS system contained a requirement for
division officer and department head approval for all new
jobs and weekly updates, at the time of the interviews no
job had ever been disapproved because of its content. Job
input forms were returned if they were not filled out
clearly or properly, or if the jobs created scheduling
problems. After the problems were corrected, the forms were
returned to the SFOMS coordinator, and the job information
was entered into the SFOMS data file without any further
incidents. The authority relationships based on work
identification, approval and assignment did not appear to
have changed as a result of the SFOMS implementation.
B. INFORMATION FLOWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The purpose of this area of questioning was to reveal
SFOMS 1 change in access to job information and the
corresponding change in authority relationships. The CO
and XO's authority was enhanced as they were better able to
monitor and subsequently control ship's force jobs. The
remaining officers and enlisted personnel understood the
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SFOMS provision allowing for greater information access to
the CO and XO, and consequently they said their perceptions
of the CO and XO's authority increased. Similarly, even
though an officer did not use SFOMS very heavily as a
management tool, if a subordinate said that his perception
was that the senior did greatly rely on the information
SFOMS provided, the subordinate said he felt the officer's
authority had indeed increased. The result of this stated
perception of increased authority resulted in work center
supervisors and CPO's paying close attention to their SFOMS
reports to prevent "getting hammered." All but one of the
work center supervisors and CPO's who did pay close atten-
tion to their reports said they found SFOMS to be a useful
management tool.
One supervisor however, said that his seniors' increased
ability to monitor his work through SFOMS was highly-
undesirable. He said he had engineered numbers for his
SFOMS report that were useless to him as a management aid.
However, they were nevertheless numbers he said he thought
his department head wanted to see because they made a good
report. The SFOMS coordinator also revealed that he had
uncovered instances where work center supervisors had
inflated their upcoming man-hour loads with inaccurate job
estimates. They did this to present a picture that their
work centers were fully programmed and could not spare any




This research demonstrated that SFOMS could increase a
seniors' ability to monitor work. Whether or not the
seniors actually used SFOMS in this manner, the result was
lower level supervisors claiming that the seniors* authority
was enhanced. This resulted in work center supervisors in
paying closer attention to their work. In the case of the
supervisor who engineered numbers and in the example pro-
vided by the SFOMS coordinator where supervisors inflated
their job estimates, this "paying closer attention" was in
reality a dysfunctional effect. Work center supervisors
improperly used SFOMS by engineering numbers to prevent a
senior from gaining greater control over them. These were
the only situations uncovered during the course of the
interviews where it was shown that proper SFOMS usage was
affected adversely because of the changes to shipboard
authority structures due to the information flow changes.
C. EFFECTS OF SFOMS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The interviews did not reveal instances where the newly
created SFOMS organization adversely affected the existing
authority structures throughout the ship. The positions of
overhaul manager and SFOMS coordinator were not viewed by
any of the respondents as having assumed any other individ-
ual's responsibil i ti tes or authority. Most interviewers
said the overhaul manager and SFOMS coordinator assumed
responsibilities and performed functions unique to overhaul
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which would not have been needed outside of the shipyard.
The work center supervisors and division officers who were
questioned stated the SFOMS organization simply helped them
to better perform their work. Therefore, no evidence was
discovered indicating the SFOMS organization had an adverse
impact on the existing authority structures.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
The crew of a ship in overhaul is confronted with the
problem of how to control a challenging level of work, a
level seldom seen outside of the shipyard. Identifying,
planning, scheduling, assigning, monitoring, and evaluating
all of the work which must be done, before the ship can
again be considered as operational, is a tremendous task
that the officers and crew must perform. To help shipboard
management better meet this challenge, the CNO directed the
development of Fleet SFOMS. Yet, at times the solution to
the problem has appeared to compound the problem. SFOMS or
any similar type of computer supported management control
system is not used by U. S. Navy ship crews outside of
overhaul. As a result, when a snip enters overhaul, its
crew is told that they must change their managing techniques
as their previous methods of managing are no longer
sufficient to meet the challenges of overhaul. This is a
problem often encountered when a new management control
system is introduced into an organization, and frequently is
the reason why the new system is doomed to failure.
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SFOMS was designed to be just one part of the entire
management system and consequently must remain in balance
with the other components of the system. The question as to
whether SFOMS causes an imbalance within a ship's authority
structure was addressed in this research. Some evidence was
encountered indicating that SFOMS did increase some individ-
uals' authority by increasing their access to information
concerning work progress. This resulted in some subordinate
personnel stating that they believed SFOMS was a management
weapon permitting superiors greater control over their
actions. Beside causing ill feelings toward SFOMS it also,
in one known instance, caused the doctoring of a SFOMS
report which originally indicated man-nour overload condi-
tions and scheduling problems to one which displayed all
work being within the immediate supervisor's control. Also,
the SFOMS Coordinator revealed that some supervisors had
falsely increased their man-hours scheduled. This was done
to prevent a senior supervisor from reading their SFOMS
report and discovering the existence of idle workers within
a work center and then reallocating the idle workers to
other centers where they were needed. These occurrences of
improper SFOMS usage as a result of SFOMS widened access of
work progress information and the subsequent increased
authority probably might not have happened if the senior
managers did not have access to information concerning man-
hour programming. Both of the examples demonstrate that an
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attempt to gain greater control over an organization by man-
agement can often result in less control. This has been
demonstrated in previous research. (Dalton and Lawrence,
1971) SFOMS did appear to affect authority structures
aboard ship by changing information access finally resulting
in improper SFOMS usage.
1. Suggested Further Research
In addition to authority, other elements of SFOMS
could unbalance the management system such as the increased
administrative workload. This area, as well as others
including the adequacy of SFOMS training, the perceived
need for a "SFOMS" system by the ship's crew and the degree
of top management support for the program could have a
potential impact on the proper use of the system. Unrealis-
tic expectations held by potential SFOMS users, the fear of
the computer, and a potential user's general resistance to
change could also have an adverse impact on proper Sr OMS
usage. All of these areas are worthy of further research
because of their importance to the implementation of a
control system.
The evidence uncovered during this research does no
c
necessarily indicate that SFOMS is the */rong system to meet
the management control challenges of overhaul, but does
indicate the need for implementors of this and similar types
of systems to be aware of the many factors governing a
successful implementation of new controls within an
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organization. To decrease the access to information SFOMS
provides, might solve the authority problems addressed in
this research but would also decrease management's control
which is what SFOMS was designed to enhance. Rather, users
of SFOMS should be made aware of the potential problems of
authority imbalances which could erupt when information
access is widened or narrowed, within a management system.
Another longer range solution to this type of problem would
be the institution of one computer supported management
control system for shipboard management's use in and out of
overhaul. According to the PRC SFOMS Project Manager,
NAVSEA is investigating that option with the development of
the Organization Maintenance Management System (OMMS) . This
system would provide ships' managers with an onboard
computer supported capability to control ships force work
all of the time. (Campbell, 1982) The use of a standard
shipboard management control system, "year round, every
year, wherever you are," could ultimately pave the way for
the resolution of many of the SFOMS use problems being
experienced today. As this system, or any system, is
implemented, it should be allowed to evolve into a dynamic
component of the entire shipboard management system. The
designers, the implementors , and most importantly, the users
should be aware of the many behavioral organizational
factors which have the potential of disrupting their
efforts. Acknowledging the existence of these factors
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probably will not automatically ensure success in the
implementation of management controls, but would provide a
basis upon which a successful management control system




Ackoff, Russell L., A Concept of Corporate Planning
,
Wiley-In terscience , 1970.
Anthony, Robert N., and Herzlinger, Regina E., management
Control in Nonprofit Organizations
,
Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1980.
Campbell, Hugh, Planning Research Corporation SFOMS Project
Manager, San Diego, CA, Interview, April 1982.
Carr, RicK, Naval Sea Systems Command SFOMS Project Manager,
Washington, DC, Telephone Interview, January 1982.
Comptroller, Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific Fleet,
Telephone Interview, April 1982.
Dal ton, Gene W. , and Lawrence, P. R. , Motivation and Control
in Organizations
,
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1971.
Doktor, Robert H., Schultz, Randall L., and Sieving,
Dennis P., Implementing Operations Research/Management
Science, American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., 1975.
Faerbor, Leroy G. , and Ratliff, Richard L., "People Problems
Behind MIS Failures," Financial Executive , v. 48, April
1980.




Keen, Peter G.W., and Morton, Michael S. Scott, Decision
Support Systems, An Organizational Perspective , Add i son-
Wesley Publishing Co., 1978.
Lee, William 3., and Steinberg, Earle, "Making Implementa-
tion a Success or Failure," Journal of Systems Management ,
v. 31, April 1980.
Long 3each Naval Shipyard, Destroyer Type Desk, Long 3each
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA, Telephone Interview, July
1982.




Markus, M. Lynne, "Implementation Politics: Top Management
Support and User Involvement," Systems Objectives Solutions
,
v. 1, November 1981.
Moen, Lee, Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Altera-
tions for Aircraft Carriers, Ship Project Manager,
Bremerton, WA, Telephone Interview, April 1932.
Morris, Dale, Planning and Engineering for Repairs and
Alterations for Aircraft Carriers, SFOMS Project Manager,
Bremerton, WA, Telephone Interview, April 1982.
NAVSEA, Naval Sea Systems Command, Surface Ship Pre-Overhaul
Planning Guide , Department of the Navy, 30 November 1977.
NAVCOMPTNOTE 7041, Change 1, Enclosure 1, "Composite Stand-
ard Military Rate," 4 Feburary 1982.
Newman, W. , Constructive Control , Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1975.
OPNAVINST (a) 3120.32, Standard Organization and Regulations
of the United States Navy
,
Department of the Navy, 27 March
1979.
OPNAVINST (b) 4790.4, Ships' 3-M Manual , Department of the
Navy, 29 April 1974.
Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations for
Cruisers and Destroyers, "SFOMS Evaluation for all Cruisers
and Destroyers," Department of the Navy, 3 November 1981.
Santos, Conrado R. , "A Theory of Bureaucratic Authority,"
Canadian Public Administration
,
v. 21, Summer 1978.




Thomas, William E., Readings in Cost Accounting and Budget




No . of copies







3. Department Chairman 1








Naval Sea Systems Command
ATTN: Mr. Tom Neubert
Washington, D. C. 20362
6. Asst. Professor Philip Bromiley 1
Code 54Bg
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 3 940








9. Office of the Comptroller, Navy 1
ATTN: CAPT John Cuddy, USN
Code 4C560



































'1 r f> 32732
Thesis
E7796&
c.l
Evensen
Ship's force overhaul
management system: an
evaluation of its
effects on shipboard
authority.
SS0i*7

